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DETERMINATION OF THE BUNDLE PRICE  
FOR DIGITAL INFORMATION GOODS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The fast emergence of Internet as a media to distribute digital information goods 
created many new opportunities for the packaging and pricing of these goods. The pricing 
of information goods introduces a challenge since the cost structure of information goods 
differs from that of conventional physical goods in that they can be costly to introduce but 
are relatively cheap to reproduce. The bundling strategy for digital information goods 
helps producers to extract more value from customers and can result in cost savings due 
to the presence of economies of scale.  
This study aims to determine the optimum price a producer of digital information 
goods has to charge for a bundle in order to maximize his gross margin. The bundle 
pricing model is constructed for both uniform and exponential distributions of the fraction 
of information goods in the bundle that has positive value for the customers.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, a pricing model for a bundle of digital information goods under 
different distributions of the fraction of goods in the bundle that has positive value for the 
customer is presented. The price for a bundle of digital information goods is determined 
so as to maximize the producer’s gross margin. It is interesting to note that although 
bundling is widely applied in practice and pricing is a major issue in bundling, optimal 
pricing of a bundle has not been treated extensively. 
Bundling can be considered as a kind of packaging, where bundled individual 
goods are sold together as a package at a single price. The price is different than the sum 
of the prices of the individual goods in the bundle. Bundling has been applied to physical 
goods such as machine tools or personal computer tools as well as to  information goods 
such as the Microsoft Office 2000. The Internet allows producers to offer more 
customized products to customers. For example, a customer can get a personalized 
newspaper by choosing a set of categories according to his/her interests. So, the user can 
read his/her customized bundle of news.  
Shapiro and Varian (1998) define information goods as goods capable of being 
distributed in digital form. The definition covers anything that can be digitized: Computer 
softwares, research reports, journals, music, movies, weather reports, video clips, stock 
quotes, photographs, newspapers are all examples of information goods.  
Varian (1998) describes three main properties of information goods, which need 
to be taken into account in the marketing of these goods. The first main property of an 
information good is that it is an experience good. One has to experience an information 
good before being able to value it. Being an experience good is not limited to digital 
information goods. In fact, any physical product entering the market for the first time, 
such as the first fax machine, or the first photocopying machine, faces the same problem. 
Promotional pricing and free samples are some strategies in order to introduce the new 
goods to the consumer. Previews and reviews such as book reviews, film reviews, music 
reviews are some further marketing strategies. Reputation and branding are other means 
of overcoming the experience good problem. 
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The second main property of information goods is that they share some properties 
of public goods. A good is a public good, if it is still available for consumption by other 
consumers, even if being consumed by another consumer (Begg et al., 1994). Air, 
national defence, and public safety are some examples of public goods. Public goods are 
both non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rival means that one’s consumption of one good 
doesn’t diminish the amount of that good available to other people. Non-excludability 
means that one person cannot exclude another person from consuming or using the good. 
In terms of non-excludability and non-rivalness, information goods resemble public 
goods. Relative to physical goods, it is more difficult to exclude other people to use, to 
consume and to enjoy information goods. Such an attempt requires additional costs such 
as detection cost and is less guaranteed since it is easy to copy information goods. The 
handling of excludability through enforcement or other means is a delicate legal and 
technological issue of utmost importance for the survival of the information goods' 
producers. Shapiro and Varian (1998) do not recommend overprotection of digital 
information goods as a protection strategy for producers.  Cheng and Png (2003) consider 
how government should set the fine for copying, tax on copying medium, and subsidy on 
legitimate purchases and how a monopoly producer sets price and spending on detection. 
They conclude that society prefers the producer to manage piracy through lower prices 
rather than increased enforcement; that a tax on the copying medium is welfare superior 
to the penalty; and that it is optimal to subsidize legitimate purchases. 
The third significant property of information goods is the returns to scale. 
Information goods are costly to produce but cheap to reproduce. The cost structure of 
information goods differs from that of physical goods. That information goods are 
relatively cheap to reproduce results a major difference in the cost structure of 
information goods as compared to physical goods. This leads to a relatively high ratio of 
fixed costs to total cost in comparison to physical goods. The fixed cost for information 
goods consists of first-copy sunk costs, marketing and promotion costs. First-copy sunk 
costs are costs incurred before production such as development costs and costs of creating 
the associated production and delivery facilities. In additon to first-copy sunk costs, 
producers of information goods need to invest heavily in marketing of their products in 
order to attract the attention of consumers and to increase the brand loyalty. Distribution 
costs constitute another component of the cost structure of information goods. With the 
developing technology, distribution costs are decreasing leading to further increase in the 
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ratio of fixed cost to total cost. This is particularly true for information goods distributed 
over the Internet. The relatively high ratio of fixed costs to total cost  results in substantial 
returns to scale such that the average cost of production decreases as the number of goods 
produced increases. The key to delivering a low-cost product or service is not effective 
process management but high cumulative output (Hayes, 2002). 
It is interesting to note that not only the ratio but also the nature of the fixed cost 
and the variable cost of information goods differ from those of physical goods (Shapiro 
and Varian, 1998). In case of information goods, the fixed cost to a large extend is sunk 
cost.  Once for some reason, production is either terminated or has not even started, large 
portion of fixed cost can not be recovered. In case of physical goods, a much larger 
portion of fixed cost can be salvaged.  Physical goods differ from digital information 
goods also by the capacity constraint imposed on their production. Once the production of 
a physical good reaches the capacity constraint, then the variable cost of producing an 
additional unit increases. Relatively heavy investment has to be made to increase the 
production capacity. This is usually not the case with information goods. The production 
of information goods faces few capacity constraints. Thus, the variable cost of producing 
an additional unit remains roughly the same over a large range of production levels. But 
the need to service customers might introduce additional capacity constraints and might 
lead to substantial costs (Hayes, 2002). 
Further interesting characteristics of digital information goods distributed over the 
Internet in contrast with the physical goods are that most inventory costs are absent and 
that reproduction and distribution operations take negligible time. But for particular 
categories of information goods there are other cost categories, capacity limits, and time 
delays substantial enough to raise serious managerial questions (Geoffrion, 2002).  
The structure of the market for information goods is a description of the behaviour 
of sellers and buyers in that market (Begg et al., 1994). The market for information goods 
is neither a perfectly competitive market nor an auction market. Recall that a perfectly 
competitive market implies the existence of several producers of an identical commodity, 
which indeed does not reflect the characteristics of a market for information goods 
because of the relative ease of product differentiation among information goods.  In 
auction markets, on the other hand, a good is sold to the customer who pays the highest 
value. Auction markets work well for goods with fixed supply such as airline seats, which 
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is not the case for information goods.  The market for information goods can be classified 
as a monopolistically competitive market. In this type of market, there are several slightly 
different products, which are close substitutes. In order to build some market power in the 
market and to be able to remain in the market, a producer of information goods should 
distinguish its goods from those of other producers. In differentiating its product, a 
producer will have no close competitors. But for success in the market it is not enough to 
differentiate the product. In addition, the producer should customize its products 
according to the needs and interests of its customers.  By customizing the product, the 
most value can be generated from customers. In a monopolistically competitive market, 
the primary concern of producers becomes the customers’ willingness to pay for the 
product rather than their competition’s behaviour (Varian, 1998).  
Sometimes it might be difficult to differentiate a product enough from the 
competitors’ products. In such a case, a strategy to compete is to decrease the price. For 
producers of physical goods, it is possible to decrease the average production cost 
through proper supply chain management and to reduce the price without reducing the 
profit margin. But for information goods, the incremental production cost is relatively 
small. Thus, it is not possible to compensate for the reduction in prices by reducing the 
incremental production costs. This implies that a reduction in the price will lead to a 
reduction in the profit margin in that case. In order to avoid the decrease in the profit 
margin, the sales volume should be increased. Hence, in the case of information goods, 
the producer has to focus on increasing the sales in order to support the strategy to 
compete through price reduction. 
The general economic principle that the price of a product should at least be equal 
to its marginal cost may not be feasible for information goods because the perfect copies 
of information goods can be reproduced at a small cost. This cost structure introduces a 
challenge for the pricing of information goods.  
Two basic pricing policies for information goods would be flat pricing and 
differential pricing.  In flat  pricing policy, each customer is charged the same price for a 
standart product. But in order to extract the maximum value from customers, the products 
need to be customized. If the product is personalized for the needs and interests of the 
customers, the producer has more flexibility to price its goods, since it is much less 
affected by its competitors’ pricing policies. The customization of products also allows 
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for the customization of prices. In addition, the maximum reservation price differs for 
each customer. All these arguments lead to differential pricing policy.  
Shapiro and Varian (1999) describe three types of differential pricing: 
1. Personalized pricing,  
2. Group pricing,  
3. Versioning. 
In “personalized pricing”, the producer charges each customer a different price. 
This method of pricing is used by some airlines. There are many factors influencing the 
price charged. This enables the producer to charge almost every customer a different 
price. 
In “group pricing”, certain groups of customers are charged different prices than 
individual customers, who don’t belong to a certain group. People who have similar 
characteristics are assumed to belong to a certain group. For instance; members of a 
group can attend the same department or take the same course in a university, they can be 
at the same age, they can use the same library, they can have a similar income structure, 
etc. 
The third strategy for differential pricing is “versioning” in which producers offer 
different versions of a good for different market segments. These market segments have 
different values of reservation prices for a particular good.  
2. BUNDLING 
Adams and Yellen (1976) define bundling as the practice of package selling. 
Sporting organizations offering season tickets, restaurants providing fixed menu  dinners, 
banks offering travelers’ check services for a single fee and garment manufacturers 
selling their retailers clothing grab bags comprised of assorted styles, sizes and colors all 
provide examples of package selling. Bundling also applies when firms sell the same 
physical commodity, such as detergents and toothpaste, in different container sizes. For 
instance, an electronic journal is a bundle of issues, each of which is a bundle of articles, 
each of which is a bundle of bibliographic information, abstract, references, text, and 
figures. It is often straightforward to rebundle any of these elements in different ways, 
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when the source material is archived in electronic form such that one might obtain all 
abstracts matching a given keyword search, or all citations appearing in a particular 
article, or just the bibliographic headers from the issue in a given year. 
There are several implementation forms of bundling (Simon and Wuebker, 1999). 
In pure bundling, only the bundle is sold. The products cannot be bought individually.  
For example, a movie rental company offering a theater owner only a bundle of movies 
rather than the option of choosing from a set of movies is exercising pure bundling. In 
mixed bundling, on the other hand, both the bundle and the individual products are 
offered to the customer. McDonald’s value meals would be an example of mixed 
bundling. Giving a discount to a second good if the first one is purchased at full price is 
another form of of mixed bundling. A special form of bundling is the so called  add-on 
bundling. An add-on product is not sold unless the lead product is purchased. For 
example, an automobile can be interpreted as a package of accessories and transport 
service. The transport service (the automobile – the lead product) can be purchased 
without accessories such as ABS or airbags. Accessories are added in order to add value 
to the good offered. 
2.1. Benefits of Bundling 
 There are many reasons that make the bundling of information goods attractive for 
producers. 
 It is impossible to know the willingness to pay of each customer for each good 
offered by producers. Uncertainty about consumer valuations creates difficulties for 
effective pricing and efficient transactions. A producer might try to maximize its profits 
by charging a price for each good that excludes some customers with low valuations for 
that good and forgoes some revenue from customers with high valuations. But in this 
case, the producer can lose some potential customers and forgoes some revenue, which 
might make this mechanism inefficient.  Stigler (1963) suggested an alternative price 
discrimination technique such as packaging two or more products in bundles rather than 
selling them separately. So, bundling is suggested as a selling strategy which makes it 
easier for the producer to extract value from a given set of goods by enabling a form of 
price discrimination. Bundling reduces the uncertainty about customer valuations such 
that it reduces the dispersion in reservation prices. 
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Bundling reduces the heterogeneity of the reservation prices and makes the 
valuations of customers more predictable. This enables the producer to increase its profits 
by enabling effective pricing. So, if customers have different reservation prices and the 
producer can’t price discriminate, all customers can purchase the good at a  price equal to 
the reservation price of the customer with the lowest value. But by creating the bundle, 
the producer can sell its goods at a price equal to the average reservation price of the  
customers and this will increase the producer’s profits. 
A customer may not currently need to use an information good in the bundle but 
later, if he decides to use an information good in the bundle, he might use this good in the 
future. This is called the option value of bundling. In this case, the incremental cost of 
bundling seems to be zero since customers don’t pay for using another good in the bundle 
but they have already paid during the purchase of the bundle. But producers usually offer 
the bundle at a price which is less than the sum of the prices of goods constituting the 
bundle. 
Bundling can result in cost savings due to the presence of economies of scale. 
Chae (1992) applied the bundling model in the study of subscription policies  for the 
cable television market. He assumed extreme economies of scale in the production and 
distribution of information goods in the cable television market. This means that 
economies of scale index is assumed to be zero such that marginal cost of producing and 
distributing a bundle of information goods is equal to the marginal cost of producing and 
distributing an individual information good. Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1968) also 
focused on the cost savings in production and transactions associated with package 
selling. 
Bundling serves to introduce new products to customers. A producer can add a new 
product into a bundle and can introduce this new product without any need for special 
advertisement. For a customer, it may be risky to buy a new product. But when the new 
product is included in a bundle of information goods, then the customer’s purchasing 
decision is made easier and its perceived risk is reduced. 
In addition, bundling introduces complementarities in production, distribution and 
consumption of bundle components. Bakos (1997) reported that bundling can directly 
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increase the value available from a set of goods due to the technological 
complementarities in production, distribution or consumption. 
Differently, Carbajo et al.(1990) and Whinston (1990) argued about the strategic 
leverage of bundling such that producers in imperfectly competitive markets may choose 
to bundle their products for strategic reasons. 
 Moreover, low marginal cost of production for information goods makes bundling 
attractive. It is not economical to offer goods at a price below their marginal costs of 
production. Since the marginal cost of producing information goods is very low, it will 
not be profitable to offer the good to a customer who values that good below its marginal 
cost of production. In addition, there exist economies of scale in the distribution of these 
goods. So, profitability can be increased by providing maximum number of goods in the 
bundle to the maximum number of customers. 
 Finally, bundling helps to reduce the search cost of customers, which is defined as 
the cost incurred by the buyer to locate an appropriate seller and to purchase a product. 
This would include the opportunity cost of time spent searching as well as associated 
expenditures such as telephone calls, computer fees, magazine subscriptions. By bundling 
information goods, search cost for customers can be decreased. 
2.2.  The Effect of Bundling on Demand 
2.2.1. The case for an individual information good 
In order to investigate the effect of bundling on demand, first the case for an 
individual information good is analyzed. The demand curve for an individual information 
good is seen in Figure 1. For ease of discussion, the price is taken to be a linear 
decreasing function of quantity demanded. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, if q units of this good are purchased, then the producer 
charges a price of p per unit and generates a revenue by an amount of (p*q). The marginal 
cost of producing one unit of an information good is represented by c. It is low compared 
to the price level p. Some customers may be willing to pay a price less than p but higher 
than c. In this case, the customer can’t purchase the good and a deadweight loss is 
created, which is given by the area of the triangle (FBE). Aside from these customers, a 
customer may be willing to pay more than p. Although it is enough to pay p to purchase 
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the good, his willingness to pay for the good is more than p. As a result, consumers’ 
surplus is created, which is given by the area of the triangle (GpF). In order to eliminate 
the deadweight loss, the producer should set the price of his goods equal to the marginal 
costs. But, this price might be too low to cover for the fixed costs of production and cause  
the profitability of the producer to decrease. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Demand curve for an individual information good 
So far it is assumed that the producer applies flat-pricing. Let us relax this 
assumption and assume that the producer is able to price discriminate instead of flat-
pricing. In case of differential pricing, the producer charges customers according to their 
willingness to pay and deadweight loss is not created. In case of perfect price 
discrimination, profits will be maximized and both customers’ surplus and deadweight 
loss are eliminated.  
2.2.2. The case for for a bundle of two goods 
Salinger (1995) developed a graphical framework in order to analyze the demand 
for a bundle of two goods with independent linear demand functions. To investigate the 
effect of bundling on demand, it is assumed that there are two goods, denoted as good 1 
and good 2 and each customer purchases either zero or one unit of each of the goods that 
can be bundled.  
In order to understand the situation assume that there are two information goods: a 
video clip and stock quotes. It is supposed that the value of each information good is 
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 between zero and one. The demand curve for each of these information goods is assumed 
to be like the one in Figure 1. In addition, it is assumed that valuation of one good is 
uncorrelated with the valuation for the other good such that if the customer gets one of 
the two goods, then the other good doesn’t become less/more attractive to him and 
therefore valuation for that good doesn’t decrease/increase. Now, assume that the 
producer bundles video clip and stock quotes and sells the two goods as a bundle instead 
of selling them separately. The reservation price for the bundle is the sum of the 
reservation prices for the individual goods. The demand curve for the bundle is seen in 
Figure 2. In Figure 2, the horizontal axis represents the quantity demanded for the bundle 
and the vertical axis the reservation price for the bundle. The area under the demand 
curve for the bundle represents the total potential surplus. This area is also equal to the 
sum of areas under the demand curves for the individual goods. The demand curve for the 
individual goods is linear but the demand curve for the bundle is not linear. 
The demand curve for the bundle is flatter around 0.5 and steeper around zero and 
one. In other words, it becomes more elastic around 0.5 and less elastic around zero  and 
one. This means that the quantity demanded for the bundle increases more around 0.5 
than around zero and one for a unit change in the price of the bundle. So, if the producer 
charges a price of 0.5, then half of the customers will buy the bundle.  
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2.2.3. The case for for a bundle of more than two goods 
Bakos (1997) argued that as the number of information goods in the bundle 
increases, the distribution for the valuation of the bundle has an increasing fraction of 
customers with moderate valuations near the mean as implied by the law of large 
numbers. So, the producer better matches the heterogenous distribution of customers by 
decreasing the heterogeneity of customers' reservation prices instead of increasing the 
menu of prices in order to perform a more effective price discrimination. This enables the 
producer to charge a single price, that almost fits all customers. 
2.3.  Profitability of Bundling 
For the case of two goods and a single producer, Adams and Yellen (1976) showed 
through the use of numerical examples that mixed bundling can increase profits under the 
assumptions that the reservation prices for the two goods in the bundle are negatively 
correlated and are additive.  
 Taking Adams–Yellen model as a starting point, Schmalensee (1984) assumed 
further that the reservation prices of the customers’ follow a bivariate Gaussian 
distribution. He found that as long as reservation prices are not perfectly correlated, the 
standart deviation of reservation prices for the bundle are less than the sum of the standart 
deviations for the two component goods. He emphasized that the reason for the 
enhancement of the profitability through bundling is that bundling reduces the dispersion 
of the reservation prices and thus the producer can extract a greater fraction of the 
consumers’ surplus. Schmalensee demostrated further that mixed bundling combines 
advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales. 
 Salinger (1995) argued that if bundling doesn’t lower costs, bundling tends to be 
profitable when reservation prices are negatively correlated and are high relative to costs. 
On the contrary, if bundling lowers costs and these costs are high relative to average 
reservation prices, the incentive to bundle increases when reservation prices are positively 
correlated. 
Bakos (1997) pointed out that bundling reduces the average deadweight loss and 
leads to higher average profits. He proposed that if it is more profitable to bundle certain 
number of goods than to sell them separately and the optimal price per good for the 
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bundle is less than the mean valuation, then bundling any number of goods greater than 
that certain number will further increase profits compared to the case where the additional 
goods are sold separately. 
Based on empirical studies Simon and Wuebker (1999) claim that mixed bundling 
always exploits profit potential better than separate pricing or pure bundling. Pure 
bundling appears to result in the lowest profits in all applications. They interpret this 
result by the resentment of the customers feeling they are forced to buy a bundle. They 
report that through mixed bundling, multi-product firms often obtain profit improvements 
in the range of 10 to 40%. 
2.4.  The Effect of Marginal Costs 
 Schmalensee (1984) pointed out that bundling can increase profits of producers by 
reducing the dispersion of the valuations of customers. But this is valid only if marginal 
costs are small. If the marginal costs are large, the producers want to increase the 
dispersion of reservation prices instead of reducing it. If the marginal cost is less than the 
mean valuation of customers, then the producer will try to reduce the dispersion of the 
reservation prices. This helps the producer to extract higher profits from all customers. 
On the contrary, if the marginal cost is greater than the mean valuation of customers, 
bundling will decrease profits. Bundling reduces the dispersion of valuations of 
customers but since marginal costs are large, the fraction of customers with valuations in 
excess of the total marginal cost of the bundle  and profits will decrease considerably. So, 
in case of great marginal costs, it is not preferable to form a bundle. 
 Bakos (1997) proposed that there is a marginal cost for each information good that 
makes bundling result in lower profits and higher deadweight loss than selling the goods 
separately. He stated that very large bundles will typically continue to be profitable even 
in the presence of non-zero but not very large marginal costs and substantial marginal 
costs make bundling unprofitable. If the bundle includes goods which have negative 
values for some customers, the benefits of bundling for the producer might be lost. For 
example, if there are too many advertisements, then the valuations of customers can be 
negative. So, bundling can decrease profits even if the marginal costs are zero. 
 With the developments in technology and the resulting rapid decreases in marginal 
costs, customers might still need to spend excessive time and energy in order to identify 
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an information good suitable for their purposes. This situation can lead to customer 
dissatisfaction and can prevent producers from increasing their profits even if they have 
attained very small marginal cost levels. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) found that the 
cognitive cost of learning the software accounts for a substantial fraction of the price of 
the software. Thus, the producers should help customers to learn and to identify their 
products in a more effective and fast manner. 
3. DETERMINING THE BUNDLE PRICE OF INFORMATION GOODS 
 The main objective in this study is to find the optimal price for a bundle 
containing N information goods for a producer whose aim is to maximize his surplus. The 
producer’s surplus is also called the gross margin and defined as the difference between 
the value received and the cost incurred for a bundle of N goods.  
A study on optimal bundle pricing, which is complementary with this study is the 
one by Hanson and Martin (1990). They presented a linear mixed integer optimization 
model for maximizing the profit of a monopolist firm. The firm establishes a price list for 
all possible bundles of components. Based on this price list customers purchase bundles 
so as to maximize their consumer’s surplus, which is included as a constraint in the 
optimization model. Reservation prices of each possible bundle for all customer segments 
are assumed to be known. In this context, for example, our model would generate the 
optimal price for each bundle on the price list. 
3.1. The Bundling Model 
In the bundling model used in this study, there are N goods in the bundle. It is 
allowed that each customer to rank the N goods in the bundle in decreasing order of 
preference such that a customer’s most favorite good in the bundle is ranked first and the 
least favourable one is ranked last. The customer may have zero or positive valuations for 
any number of  goods in the bundle. By assuming a linear demand function for all 
positive-valued goods, an individual customer’s valuation for good n in the bundle, v(n), 
can be modeled as 












−=
Np
nvnv
.
1.)( 0                                                                    (1) 
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where: 
  v0 : reservation price of a customer for the most favored good in the bundle, 
   p : fraction of goods in the bundle that has non-zero value to the customer, 
  N : number of goods in the bundle. 
Figure 3 shows the valuation of individual goods in the bundle by an individual 
customer. The valuation function is linear and decreasing as suggested by (1). The 
variable p represents the slope of the linear demand curve and also indicates the fraction 
of goods in the bundle that has positive value to the customer. For instance, a customer 
with p=0.02 is willing to pay a non-zero value for only two goods in a bundle of hundred 
goods. The most highly valued good for the customer is represented by v0  and obtained 
by putting n=0 in (1) and it is also the y-intercept in Figure 3. Valuations of N goods in 
the bundle are ranked in decreasing order of preference and linearly decreases starting 
from v0. The valuation for the subsequently ranked goods is assumed to fall down at a 
constant rate until it reaches zero at n=pN, which represents the number of positively 
valued goods in the bundle. (N-pN) goods have zero valuation for the customer.  
Figure 3. Valuation of goods in the bundle by an individual customer 
v(n)= v0 [1- ( n / p.N) ] 
v(n) 
0                                   p.N                       N           n
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3.2. Assumptions 
 In this study, the optimal bundle price is found under the following assumptions: 
i) No information good in the bundle has negative value with the assumption of 
free disposal. This assumption implies that customers are free to discard any unwanted 
good in the bundle at zero cost contrary to physical goods, which may result in a disposal 
cost for their removal. 
ii) The aggregate reservation price for a bundle of N goods is equal to the sum of 
the reservation prices for the individual goods constituting the bundle. 
iii) The value a customer places on one good in the bundle is independent of 
whether he consumes another good in the bundle. This assumption indicates that access to 
one good in the bundle doesn’t make the other goods in the bundle more or less attractive.  
iv) The marginal costs of  goods in the bundle are close to each other. 
v) The reservation price of customers to pay for the most favored good in the 
bundle is taken to be uniformly distributed between zero and one. 
3.3. The General Model 
 Recall that the aim in this study is to find the bundle price, which maximizes the 
gross margin (GM) for the producer of information goods. GM can be defined as:    
GM= [ ]∫∫ −
B
BB
R
dpdvpvfMCP .).,(. 00                                  (2) 
where: 
PB: the price of the bundle, 
MCB: the marginal cost of the bundle, 
f(v0,p): the probability density function of the customers in the {v0 ,p} space, 
RB: the region over which the double integral is defined. 
First, it is needed to identify the region RB, which is defined by the lower and 
upper bounds of the double integral. Therefore, the lower and upper limits should be 
determined in order to determine GM quantitatively. Second, f(v0,p) should be specified 
in order to obtain GM.  
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Since the random variables v0 and p are independent, f(v0 ,p) becomes f(v0)f(p). 
Then (2) becomes: 
GM= [ ]∫ ∫
=
=
=
=
−
2
2
10
10
00 .).().(.
up
lp
uv
lv
dpdvpfvfMCP BB                                (3) 
Next, the lower and upper bounds in (3) should be determined. The lower bound 
for p is (1/N)  and upper bound to be 1 such that the range becomes [1/N ≤ p ≤ 1]. 
 
Figure 4.  Valuation of goods in the bundle by an individual customer 
The upper bound for v0 is 1 and the lower bound for v0 need to be determined. The 
necessary condition to form a bundle is that the net benefit obtained from purchasing the 
bundle should at least be equal to or greater than zero such that UB ≥ 0. So, the critical net 
benefit value to form a bundle is UB = 0 such that: 
UB = vB-PB = 0                                                              (4) 
 where vB is the total valuation for the bundle. In (4) , the price of the bundle isn’t known 
and the optimal bundle price that maximizes GM will be determined. The total valuation 
for the bundle, vB is defined as 
n=1          n=2          n=3                                        n 
1
1
1
v(n) 
v0-v(1)= Np
v
.
0
v(1)-v(2) 
v(2)-v(3) 
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vB  = ∫
N
dnnv
0
).( +δ                                                    (5) 
where ∫
N
dnnv
0
).(  represents the total area under the linear valuation curve, which is found 
to be [v0 (p.N)/2]; and δ represents the total area of triangles over the linear valuation 
curve and is determined by using Figure 4. 
Note that the area of each triangle becomes [v0 / 2pN]. Since in total there are p.N 
triangles, the total area of triangles, δ  becomes [v0 / 2].                                  
So the valuation for the bundle, vB can be calculated as 
    vB= 2
)..(0 Npv +
2
0v                                        (6) 
The lower bound for v0, l1 can be obtained by substituting (6) into (4) to result in:  
                                                
2
)..(0 Npv +
2
0v -PB=0             (7) 
Solving (7) for v0 results in l1 : 
    l1 = 1.
2
+Np
PB                                                             (8) 
After substituting for the lower and upper bounds, expression (3) can be written as: 
: 
  GM= ∫
1
1
N
[ ] dpdvpfvfMCP
Np
P
BB
B
.).().(. 00
1
1.
.2
∫
+
−                                   (9) 
Now, in order to specify the {v0, p} space, several probability distributions for p 
can be assumed. In this paper, the analysis will be made both for the exponential and 
uniform probability distributions for  p. In the case of the exponential distribution, a high 
proportion of customers positively value a small number of goods in the bundle. In the 
case of the uniform distribution, the probability that customers positively value any 
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number of goods in the bundle is equal.  After integrating GM with respect to PB in (9), 
the optimal bundle price PB* and the corresponding optimal gross margin GM* will be 
determined. This will be performed for two different models: The model incorporating 
economies of scale and the model incorporating transaction and transmission cost. 
3.4.  The Model Incorporating Economies of Scale 
 In this section, the optimal bundle price and the corresponding GM will be 
determined by incorporating the economies of scale index e into the expression for MCB 
in terms of the marginal cost of individual goods, MCg: 
    MCB=Ne.MCg                                                                           (10) 
The economies of scale index e varies in the range [0.0,1.0]. Note that when e<1.0, 
then the bundle of N information goods is cheaper to produce and sell than N individual 
goods. Therefore, the producer can realize cost savings through the bundling of goods. 
When e=1.0, then there are no economies of scale in the production and selling of the 
bundle of N goods. No cost savings can be realized by bundling. When e=0.0, then 
extreme economies of scale exists and this increases the cost savings to such an extent, 
that the cost of producing and selling a bundle of N goods is same as the corresponding 
cost for  only one individual good in the bundle.  
3.4.1. The Case with the Uniform Probability Distribution for the Fraction of the 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
 First, the optimal bundle price and the corresponding gross margin will be found 
for uniformly distributed p. The probability distribution functions for p and v0 can be 
written as: 
  1, 11 ≤≤ p
N
 
         f(p)=          (11) 
   0, otherwise        
and 
   1, 10 0 ≤≤ v                                                                                 
         f(v0)=         (12) 
  0, otherwise 
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Substituting their corresponding expressions for MCB, f(p) and f(v0) into (9), the 
following result for the gross margin GM is obtained: 
GM =
N
NPPNNMCP BBegB ))1log(.22log..21).(.( +−+−−              (13) 
In order to maximize GM, the first derivative of expression (13) with respect to PB 
is taken and is solved to find the optimal bundle price PB*. A check on second derivative 
is performed to secure that the following expression is indeed a maximizing one: 
PB*  =    
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )2log.41log.4
12log.21log.2... 1
−+





 −
+−+−
N
N
NNNMCN eg
              (14) 
The  optimal gross margin GM* obtained by substituting for PB*  into (13) is 
reported in Appendix 1. 
  3.4.2. The Case with the Exponential ProbabilityDistribution for the Fraction of the 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
 Next, the optimal bundle price PB*  and the corresponding optimal gross margin 
GM* will be determined for exponentially distributed p. The probability distribution 
functions for p and v0 are written as: 
        ββ
p
e
−
1 , 11 ≤≤ p
N
 
f(p)=                                                                                                     (15) 
       0, otherwise 
and  
         1, 10 0 ≤≤ v  
  
 f(v0)=         (16) 
        0,otherwise 
     
Substituting their corresponding expressions for MCB, f(p) and f(v0) into (9), the 
following result for the gross margin GM is obtained:  
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where ExpIntegralEi[z] is defined as: 
                                               ExpIntegralEi[z]=- ∫
∞
−
−
z
t
t
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In order to maximize GM, the first derivative of expression (17) with respect to PB 
is taken and is solved to find the optimal bundle price PB*. A check on second derivative 
is performed to secure that PB*  given in expression (18) indeed results in maximum GM. 
The  optimal gross margin GM* obtained by substituting for PB*  into (17) is 
reported in Appendix 2. 
3.5. The Model Incorporating Transaction and Transmitting Costs 
 In section 3.4, the economies of scale was incorporated into the model. In this 
section, the marginal cost for the bundle of information goods is stated in its components.  
 The marginal cost for the bundle of information goods is assumed to consists 
mainly of transaction and transmitting costs. The transaction costs can be subdivided into 
fixed and variable costs. Fixed cost of transaction denoted here by F is the cost 
component incurred for each transaction independent of the value of that transaction 
represented by the bundle price PB. The variable cost of transaction, on the other hand,  is 
the cost component charged in proportion r to the value of the transaction, namely PB. 
Thus, the larger PB is, the greater the variable component of the transaction cost becomes. 
Aside from transaction costs, another cost component is the transmitting cost, incurred 
due to downloading of information goods. It is assumed that customers are given the 
chance to download as many goods as they wish from the bundle. As the number of 
goods downloaded increases, the cost of transmitting increases with the same proportion. 
In addition, in this study the expected fraction of information goods required to be 
downloaded by customers is calculated in order to estimate the expected number of goods 
to be downloaded from the bundle. So the marginal cost for a bundle of N information 
goods is written as: 
  MCB=F + r.PB + mf.N.D                                                                 (19) 
where D is the unit cost of transmitting and mf .N represents the expected number of 
goods required to be downloaded by customers with mf being defined as:  
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∫ ∫
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N Np
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dpdvpfvf
dpdvpfvfp
m                                                  (20) 
Now, the optimal bundle price PB*  and the corresponding optimal gross margin 
GM* will be calculated for both uniform and exponential distributions of  p. 
3.5.1. The Case with the Uniform Probability Distribution for the Fraction of the 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
 When f(p) and f(v0) are substituted into (20) and the integrations are performed, mf 
becomes:  
  mf  = 
( )
( )( )1log..24log.1.2
1log..42log..4..4.412
+−+−
++−−+−
NPPNN
NPPPNPN
BB
BBBB                        (21) 
Substituting mf into expression (19), the following expression is obtained for MCB : 
MCB= DNPrF B .. ++ .
( )
( )( ) 





+−+−
++−−+−
1log..24log.1.2
1log..42log..4..4.412
NPPNN
NPPPNPN
BB
BBBB   (22) 
Then the expression (22) for MCB is substituted into the expression (9) to obtain 
GM:  
GM=
( )( ) ( )( )( )
N
PNrPFPDPNND BBBB
.2
4log1.1..22log...4.41.1. +−−++−−+−
−  
           
( ) ( )
N
NrPPFDP BBB
.2
1log....4 +−+−
+                                            (23)                                          
In order to maximize GM, the first derivative of expression (23) with respect to PB 
is taken and is solved to find the optimal bundle price PB*. A check on second derivative 
is performed to secure that the following expression is indeed a maximizing one: 
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PB*=
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )1log.24log.1.2
1log..24log..21.1
+−−
+−+−+−+−
Nr
NDFFDrDN                 (24) 
The  optimal gross margin GM* obtained by substituting for PB*  into (23) is 
reported in Appendix 3. 
3.5.2. The Case with the Exponential Probability Distribution for the Fraction of the 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
 Next, the optimal bundle price and the corresponding gross margin will be 
determined for exponentially distributed p. When f(p) and f(v0) are substituted into (20) 
and the integrations are performed, the mf becomes: 
mf=
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mf  is substituted into (19) and the MCB becomes: 
MCB = DNPrF B .. ++ . 
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The expression (26) for MCB is substituted into the expression (9) to obtain GM:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( BBBN PNNDFerPPNDFeGM .2...1..2.1..
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After similar calculations as above, PB* is found to be: 
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The  optimal gross margin GM* is obtained by substituting for PB*  into (27) and 
is reported in Appendix 4. 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
In this section, some numerical illustrations of the two models of uniform and 
exponential distributions for the fraction of the positively valued goods in the bundle, 
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namely p are presented. Recall that for the case of the exponential distribution, the 
probability that a customer positively values a number of goods in a bundle of N goods 
becomes less as the number of positively valued goods increases. For the case of the 
uniform distribution, on the other hand, the probability that customers positively value 
any number of goods in a bundle of N goods is equal.  
In both scenarios following,  the optimal gross margin GM* will be found for both 
uniform and exponential distributions.  In the first scenario, the impact of different levels 
of economies of scale on GM* is investigated.  In the second scenario, transaction and 
transmitting costs for information goods are taken into account and GM* is determined 
for various levels of transaction and transmitting costs. 
4.1. First Scenario  
First set of experiments. The first set of experiments investigates the effect of 
economies of scale on the optimal gross margin. The number of goods in the bundle N 
and the marginal cost for an individual information good MCg are taken to be 50 and 0.1, 
respectively for both uniform and exponential distributions. The β parameter for the 
exponential distribution is assumed to be 1.0. The optimal gross margin for both uniform 
and exponential models is obtained for different economies of scale index values by 
solving expressions (29) and (30), respectively. The corresponding optimal gross margin 
values are reported in Table 1 under GM*(Uni) for the uniform model and under 
GM*(Exp) for the exponential model. 
Table 1.  The effect of economies of scale (e) [First set of experiments] 
e GM*(Uni) GM*(Exp)
0.00 0.902 0.900
0.25 0.863 0.841 
0.50 0.762 0.716 
0.75 0.523 0.424 
1.00 0.227 0.059 
 
 As seen from Table 1, the smaller the economies of scale index, the larger the 
gross margin obtained by the producer. Recall that when the economies of scale index is 
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less than one, then there exists economies of scale and the bundle of N information goods 
is cheaper to produce and sell than N individual goods. Therefore, the producer can 
realize cost savings through the bundling of goods. The gross margin obtained under the 
uniform distribution for the positively valued goods is consistently larger than the case 
under the exponential distribution with the difference decreasing though as the economies 
of scale index e approaches zero.  
Second set of experiments. Under the second set of experiments, the effect of the 
bundle size on the optimal gross margin is investigated first for the model employed in 
the first set of experiments. For different bundle sizes, the optimal gross margin for both 
uniform and exponential distributions is obtained by solving expressions (29) and (30), 
respectively. The corresponding optimal gross margin values are displayed in Table 2.    
Table 2.  The effect of  bundle size (N) [Second set of experiments] 
N GM*(Uni) GM*(Exp)
2 0.060 0.056
5 0.140 0.134 
10 0.270 0.265 
20 0.439 0.427 
40 0.520 0.517 
 
From Table 2, it is clear that as the number of goods comprising the bundle 
increases, the optimal gross margin obtained by the producer increases. The optimal gross 
margin values are slightly but consistently better for the uniform distribution.  
4.2. Second Scenario  
Third set of experiments. In the third set of experiments, transaction and 
transmitting costs for information goods are incorporated into the model employed in the 
first set of experiments. The effect of different levels of transaction and transmitting costs 
on the optimal gross margin is analyzed. The economies of scale index, namely e is taken 
to be 0.50. The optimal gross margin is found for different transaction and transmitting 
cost values for both uniform and exponential models by solving expressions (31) and 
(32), respectively. The calculated optimal gross margin values are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 reveals that the gross margin for the producer increases  as the transaction 
and transmitting costs of information goods decrease. The optimal gross margin values 
are consistently better for the uniform distribution. But the difference between the optimal 
gross margins for both distributions decreases as the transaction and transmitting costs 
decrease. With improving data transmission and compression technologies, the gross 
margin of the producer is expected to increase further. 
Table 3.  The effect of transaction and transmitting costs (D) [Third set of experiments] 
D GM*(Uni) GM*(Exp)
0.1 0.866 0.844
0.2 0.786 0.750 
0.3 0.683 0.603 
0.4 0.551 0.412 
  
Fourth set of experiments. The effect of the bundle size on the optimal gross 
margin is investigated under the parameter setting of the second set of experiments with 
the transaction and transmitting costs being set at the 0.1 level for both uniform and 
exponential distributions. The optimal gross margin is found for different bundle sizes by 
substituting into expressions (31) and (32). The corresponding optimal gross margin 
values are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. The effect of bundle size (N) [Fourth set of experiments] 
N GM*(Uni) GM*(Exp)
2 0.069 0.051
5 0.152 0.141 
10 0.283 0.271 
20 0.448 0.437 
40 0.532 0.524 
 
As seen in Table 4, the optimal gross margin increases as the bundle size becomes 
larger. As has been the case in the third set of experiments, the optimal gross margin 
values are slightly but consistently better for the uniform distribution. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 The determination of the price of information goods introduces problems for the 
producers of these goods. The problem encountered in the pricing of these goods arises 
from  their cost structure. The cost of producing the first unit of an information good is 
relatively  large compared to the cost of producing an additional perfect copy, which is 
relatively small. On the other hand, competitive market mechanism may force prices to 
drop to the level of marginal costs of information goods. But, if producers determine the 
price of information goods equal to their marginal costs, they can not recover their initial 
costs. Producers might prefer to sell their goods in the form of a bundle instead of selling 
them individually. The bundling strategy enables producers to increase their surplus by 
extracting more value from customers. 
 In this study, the optimal price for a bundle of information goods is to be 
determined. The objective is to maximize the producer’s gross margin.  
In the bundling model presented here, it is assumed that each customer ranks the 
goods in the bundle in decreasing order of preference in a linear trend. The valuation for 
each good in the bundle is described in terms of the reservation price for the most favored 
good in the bundle. The value of each good in the bundle is not allowed to have negative 
value. In addition, it is assumed that the valuation of a customer for a good in the bundle 
is independent with his valuation for other goods in the bundle. Aside from that, the total 
sum of the reservation price for each individual good in the bundle is equal to the 
reservation price for the aggregated bundle. 
 In order to determine the producer’s surplus, the lower bound for the reservation 
price of the most favored good in the bundle is found in terms of the bundle price, while 
the upper bound is taken to be one. 
 The study involves two models according to which the optimal bundle price is 
determined. In the first model, economies of scale index is incorporated into the 
producer’s surplus function. In that way, the effect of cost savings with the presence of 
economies of scale introduced by bundling is investigated. In the second model, the 
transaction and transmitting costs of information goods are incorporated into the surplus 
function. The marginal cost is assumed to consist mainly of transaction and transmitting 
costs. Transaction costs are taken to have fixed and variable components. Aside from 
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that, customers are allowed to download as many goods as required from the bundle and 
transmitting costs are calculated accordingly.  
The valuation for the goods in the bundle differs for each customer. Therefore, the 
fraction of information goods in the bundle with non-zero value to each customer varies. 
So, the fraction of information goods positively valued by customers is assumed to be 
distributed uniformly and exponentially. The optimal bundle price for the first and second 
models is obtained for these two different distributions.  
Some numerical results are given for the two models. Two effects are investigated 
for each model. For the first model incorporating economies of scale, the effect of the 
change in economies of scale and in the size of the bundle on the producer’s surplus are 
investigated. It is seen that as the economies of scale index decreases, the surplus of the 
producer increases. As the economies of scale index decreases, the increase in the 
producer’s surplus is more steep for the exponential distribution compared to the uniform 
distribution. Concerning the bundle size, it is observed that the larger the bundle size the 
greater the producer’s surplus obtained. In this case, for both uniform and exponential 
distributions the results are very similar. The distribution of the fraction of goods in the 
bundle with non-zero value for each customer doesn’t have any considerable effect on the 
producer’s surplus.  
For the second model incorporating the transaction and transmitting costs, the 
effect of the changes in transmitting costs and in the bundle size on the producer’s surplus 
is illustrated. It is found that with decreasing transmitting costs parallel to the 
developments in data transmission and compression technologies, the producer’s surplus 
increases further. The decrease in the producer’s surplus is more steep for the exponential 
distribution compared to the uniform distribution as the transmitting costs increase. 
Similar to the first model, as the bundle size becomes larger, the producer’s surplus 
increases and the type of the distribution of the fraction of goods in the bundle that have 
non-zero value for each customer doesn’t have any considerable impact on the producer’s  
surplus.    
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APPENDIX 1.  The Case of Uniform Probability Distribution for the Fraction of 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
GM*= ( )( )( ) ( )( )( .2log..1.2log4log.14log1log.2.. egeg NMCNNNNMC +−−−+−+
( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )( )1log...21.1log1log.21log(.2log.24log ++−+−++++ NNMCNNNN eg  
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APPENDIX 2. The Case of Exponential Probability Distribution for the Fraction of 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle 
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APPENDIX 3. The Case of Uniform Probability Distribution for the Fraction of 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle with Transaction and Transmission Costs 
Included 
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APPENDIX 4. The Case of Exponential Probability Distribution for the Fraction of 
Positively Valued Goods in the Bundle with Transaction and Transmission Costs 
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